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COMMENT
GAY RIGHTS COALITION
v. GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY: FAILURE
TO RECOGNIZE A
CATHOLIC
UNIVERSITY'S
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
PAUL E. O'CONNELL*
The first amendment of the United States Constitution' provides for
the protection of religious liberty by absolutely prohibiting the proscrip-
tion by government of any religious belief.2 However, while the freedom
* Member, St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. The religion clauses apply to state action as
well through operation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1156 (2d ed. 1988).
2 See 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 21.6, at 394 (1986). "The prohibition of any religious belief by the govern-
ment could never withstand analysis under the religion clauses. These clauses have pro-
scribed all government judgments concerning the propriety or truthfulness of religious doc-
trine." Id.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the free exercise clause to constitute
an absolute prohibition against governmental regulation of religious beliefs. See, e.g., Gil-
lette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (free exercise clause bars "interference with
the dissemination of religious ideas"); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) ("free-
dom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute"); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (religious groups have "power to decide for themselves, free from
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to believe is absolute, religious groups engaged in secular activities will
not be excused from compliance with governmental regulation of their
conduct when the state can establish the existence of a compelling state
interest s and the absence of less restrictive means of achieving that inter-
est." The judicial approach to determining the validity of free exercise
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine"); see
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("The door of the Free Exercise Clause
stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such. Gov-
ernment may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief nor penalize or discriminate
against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authori-
ties.") (citations omitted); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (statute requir-
ing declaration of belief in God as test for public office violates free exercise clause).
In its initial interpretation of the free exercise clause in Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878), the Supreme Court noted the distinction between freedom to believe and
freedom to act. "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot inter-
fere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Id. at 166. With the
adoption of the free exercise clause, "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order." Id. at 164; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940) ("conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society"); see also
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607-09 (permitting application of Sunday closing laws to orthodox
Jewish merchants); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944) (upholding convic-
tion of Jehovah's Witness for furnishing minor with religious literature to sell on street in
violation of state's child labor law); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (refusing to exempt Mormons
from application of criminal anti-polygamy statute).
" See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (when fundamental right is at
stake, burden is on government to show existence of compelling interest). The government
may justify a limitation of religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (gov-
ernment's interest in efficient social security system justifies forcing Amish employer to
comply with law in violation of his faith); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (in-
terest in uniform day of rest held sufficiently compelling); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) (same). "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'"
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
Once the existence of a compelling state interest has been established, there must be a
determination of whether the interests of government are sufficient to overcome a defense
based on a free exercise. See J. NOWAY, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTuMONAL LAW 1076-
78 (3d ed. 1986). "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served" will be considered sufficiently compelling. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972); see also Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of
Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 359 n.55 (1980) (suggesting method for determin-
ing whether state's interest is compelling).
" See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("state may justify an inroad on
religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compel-
ling state interest"). The burden imposed upon the religious group must be "narrowly tai-
lored" to achieve the government's objective. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (order awarding access to company's billing envelopes held
not to be narrowly tailored means of furthering state's interest in promoting speech by ex-
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claims has been to balance the state's interest in regulation against the
resulting burden on religious practice.6 Recently, in Gay Rights Coalition
v. Georgetown University," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
ruled that the District of Columbia's interest in eradicating sexual orien-
tation discrimination 7 was sufficiently compelling to "outweigh" any re-
sulting burden that would be placed on a Catholic university's free exer-
cise of religion.8
In Gay Rights Coalition, two student gay rights groups at George-
town University, the Gay People of Georgetown University ("GPGU")
and the Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center
posing customers to variety of views). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1242-51.
" See 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, § 21.8, at 402. The balancing test
"implies that the degree of burden on religious activity is to be balanced against the impor-
tance of the state interest and the degree to which it would be impaired by an accommoda-
tion for the religious practice." Id.; see, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
604 (1983) (governmental interest in "eradicating racial discrimination in education" was
overriding and sufficiently compelling); see also Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the
Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 1514, 1519 (1979) (most significant variables in balancing test "are nature and strength
of the governmental interest and the extent to which it can be realized if a religious exemp-
tion is granted"). The Supreme Court has indicated that "a State's interest ... however
highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on funda-
mental rights . . . protected by the free exercise clause." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. But cf.
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. Rv. 327 (1969) (discussing
standards and guidelines in lieu of balancing test).
If the government fails to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest, the free exer-
cise claim will prevail. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719 (governmental interest of avoiding
"widespread unemployment" insufficient to justify infringement on religious freedom of Je-
hovah's Witness who refused to work on military project); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, 234
(state's interest in enforcing compulsory school attendance not of "sufficient magnitude to
override the interest" of Amish to educate their own children); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407-09
(state lacked compelling interest to justify denial of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarian
who refused to work on Saturday and was fired); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S.
573, 576-78 (1944) (ordinance imposing license tax on Jehovah's Witness who distributed
religious materials violated first amendment).
6 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
This interest has been codified in D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1987), which provides:
It is the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia, in enacting this chap-
ter, to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason
other than that of individual merit, including, but not limited to, discrimination by
reason of [various characteristics including sexual orientation].
Id.
In order to ensure equality of treatment in education, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520(1)
(1987) provides that "[lit is an unlawful discriminatory practice.., for an educational insti-
tution ... [t]o deny, restrict, or to abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any of its
facilities and services to any person ... based upon ... sexual orientation." Id. The statute
defines "sexual orientation" to include "male or female homosexuality." Id. § 1-2502(28).
" Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 5.
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("GRC"),1 sought to obtain "University Recognition" and equal access to
the facilities and services accompanying that status."' Georgetown denied
official recognition, concluding that such endorsement would be inappro-
priate for a Catholic university." Subsequently, both groups brought suit
against Georgetown alleging that refusal to grant the requested status
constituted a violation of the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act
("Act"),"' which prohibits discrimination by an educational institution
against any individual based on sexual orientation.'3 The superior court
partially granted the student groups' motion for summary judgment on
the statutory issue and ordered that the only issue set for trial would be
the validity of Georgetown's alleged constitutional defense.1 4 The court
ruled after trial that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to the Uni-
versity in light of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 5
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals severed the
"artificial connection" between the "endorsement" and the tangible bene-
fits contained in "University Recognition.' 6 Writing for the majority,
* See id. at 8-9. The GPGU was initially organized on campus on October 13, 1977 and held
weekly meetings thereafter. Id. Similar actions took place when the GRC was organized at
the Law Center. Id.
10 Id. at 14. Both groups were granted "Student Body Endorsement." Id. However, after
two attempts, neither group was able to obtain "University Recognition." Id. As a result, the
groups were entitled to receive assistance from the Student Government and use university
facilities, but were specifically denied (i) use of a campus mailbox, (ii) use of the Computer
Label Service, (iii) use of the mailing services, and (iv) the right to apply for funding. Id. at
10.
H Id. at 11-12. In denying "University Recognition" the administration explained:
This situation involves a controversial matter of faith and the moral teachings of
the Catholic Church. "Official" subsidy and support of a gay student organization
would be interpreted by many as endorsement of the positions taken by the gay
movement on a full range of issues. While the University supports and cherishes the
individual lives and rights of its students it will not subsidize this cause. Such an
endorsement would be inappropriate for a Catholic University.
Memorandum from Dean W. Schuerman to the Student Government (Feb. 6, 1979), re-
printed in Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 11-12 (emphasis added by court). See gener-
ally HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE MAGISTERIUM: DOCUMENTS FROM THE VATICAN AND THE
U.S. BISHOPS 1975-1985 (J. Gallagher ed. 1986) [hereinafter HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE
MAGISTERIUM].
1 See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 14.
" See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 14.
" Id. at 16.
00 Id. at 5. Neither Georgetown nor the student groups requested that the "endorsement"
element of "University Recognition" be distinguished from the "tangible benefits" that ac-
company the status. Id. at 20 n.16. However, Judge Mack determined that this separation
was "fundamental" and based her analysis on that distinction. Id. at 20. This analysis was
strongly rejected by Judge Ferren, concurring in part and dissenting in part, who criticized
the majority's attempt to "erroneously distinguish between tangible and intangible benefits
32 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
Judge Mack declared that the Act did not require one private actor to
"endorse" another and determined that, while the statute did not require
Georgetown to provide "University Recognition,""' it did forbid the Uni-
versity from denying "facilities and services" to the student groups on the
basis of sexual orientation."8 The court acknowledged that enforcement of
the Act burdened Georgetown's free exercise of religion, 9 but held that
the District of Columbia's interest in eradicating sexual orientation dis-
crimination was sufficiently compelling to override the University's free
exercise claim.20
In vigorously dissenting to this part of the opinion,21 Judge Belson
asserted that a violation of the Act would require a showing of discrimi-
nation based on one's status as a member of a protected group.2 The
dissent argued that Georgetown denied "University Recognition" to the
two groups because of their promotion of ideas and activities antithetical
in evaluating the reach of the Human Rights Act." Id. at 47 (Ferren, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
" Id. at 39. The majority accepted the trial court's finding that a grant of "University Rec-
ognition" by Georgetown would necessarily include "an institutional 'endorsement' of the
recipient student group." Id. at 19 n.14. Judge Mack described the grant of "University
Recognition" as "a symbolic gesture, a form of speech by a private, religiously affiliated
educational institution." Id. at 20. The court, in surveying the free speech cases, quoted
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943), and concluded that
the Human Rights Act could not constitutionally require the granting of "University Recog-
nition," thereby avoiding the issue of Georgetown's free exercise defense. Gay Rights Coali-
tion, 536 A.2d at 22-26 ("state has no 'power to force an American citizen publicly to profess
any statement of belief' "). On statutory, rather than constitutional grounds, the court de-
termined that Georgetown's refusal did not violate the statute. Id. at 5.
In dictum, however, the court concluded that "[g]overnment compulsion to grant 'Uni-
versity Recognition' would threaten both the free speech and free exercise guarantees of the
First Amendment." Id. at 25; see also infra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing com-
pelled expression).
"' Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 39. The court determined that the Human Rights Act
required Georgetown "to equally distribute, without regard to sexual orientation, the tangi-
ble benefits." Id. at 26. The court also concluded that a review of the trial record revealed
"no genuine dispute that the tangible benefits were denied on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. The Human Rights Act was violated to that extent." Id.
" Id. at 31. Although the court determined the "University Recognition" question solely on
statutory grounds, it did consider Georgetown's free exercise claim concerning the failure to
provide tangible benefits. Id. at 30-39.
'0 Id. at 38.
" The Gay Rights Coalition court was greatly divided, with two concurring opinions and
four separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
22 See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 65-66 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Judge Belson asserted that the Act clearly does not prohibit discrimination based
upon a group's advocacy. "Rather, it prohibits discrimination against persons based upon
their 'sexual orientation' which, in the words of the statute, 'means male or female homosex-
uality, heterosexuality and bisexuality, by preference or practice.'" Id. at 65 (Belson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(28) (1987)).
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to Catholic teachings, rather than their status as homosexuals.2" Judge
Belson criticized the majority's "consistent short-weighting of
Georgetown's first amendment rights in the constitutional balancing pro-
cess"' 4 and concluded that even if there was a valid finding that
Georgetown had violated the statute, the University should prevail based
on its constitutional rights to free speech and free exercise of religion.2 5
The Gay Rights Coalition court has construed the Act to require
Georgetown University to violate its own religious obligations by subsi-
dizing a doctrine of sexual ethics that directly conflicts with the teachings
of the Roman Catholic Church. It is submitted that the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals did not adequately balance Georgetown's free-
exercise claim against the District's interest in eradicating sexual orienta-
tion discrimination. This Comment will examine the extent of the burden
which the Act places on Georgetown's religious liberty and will assert that
the court has intruded too deeply into intimate matters of religious doc-
trine. Furthermore, this Comment will assert that Georgetown's first
amendment rights have been unnecessarily abridged due to the presence
of an alternative solution that would be less restrictive of the University's
religious exercise.
THE RELIGIOUS OBJECTION TO STATUS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
HOMOSEXUALS
Georgetown is a Catholic university which abides by the teachings of
the Roman Catholic Church. 26 The Catholic Church has established a
clear doctrine regarding homosexuality.2 7 As a Catholic institution,
Georgetown may neither condone nor remain neutral towards homosexu-
ality or the homosexual lifestyle.2 8 In an attempt to assume a public
13 See id. at 64-66 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Belson
presented an analogous situation in which Georgetown could justifiably deny recognition to
a group actively advocating and facilitating acts of adultery and fornication. See id. at 66
(Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
24 Id. at 63 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
25 Id. at 74 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Belson agreed with the
majority's conclusion that the first amendment protected Georgetown from being required
to endorse the groups. However, he criticized the majority's "inconsistent" conclusion that
the University could be forced to subsidize the groups' activities. Id. at 63 (Belson, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Georgetown's free speech claim).
" See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 5-8. The University's Faculty Handbook "de-
scribes 'Georgetown University as an American, Catholic, Jesuit institution of higher learn-
ing,' seeking to 'uphold, defend, propagate, and elucidate the integral Christian and Ameri-
can cultural heritage.'" Id. at 7 (quoting Handbook).
,' See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
21 See Statement of Archbishop John R. Roach on Homosexuality (Jan. 1978), reprinted in
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE MAGISTERIUM, supra note 11, at 10. "[T]he Catholic community
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stance that would be consistent with the normative teachings of the
Church,29 Georgetown denied the GPGU and GRC access to those "facili-
ties and services" that would indicate a position of University endorse-
ment. 0 However, the Church prohibits all Catholics from discriminating
against people solely due to their "status" as homosexuals."1 Therefore,
recognizes and affirms the human dignity and worth of homosexuals as persons, and accord-
ingly calls for the protection of their basic human rights ... however, it cannot sanction the
gay lifestyle as a morally acceptable alternative to heterosexual marriage." Id.
[H]omosexuals are certainly to be treated with understanding and encouraged to
hope that they can some day overcome their difficulties and their inability to fit into
society in a normal fashion.... However, no pastoral approach may be taken which
would consider these individuals morally justified on the grounds that such acts are
in accordance with their nature. For, according to the objective moral order homosex-
ual relations are acts deprived of the essential ordination they ought to have.
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Some Questions of Sex-
ual Ethics (Dec. 29, 1975), reprinted in 21 THE POPE SPEAKS 58, 66 (1976). The normative
teachings of the Church indicate that "the exercise of the sexual function has its true mean-
ing and is morally good only in legitimate marriage." Id. at 64. See generally M. DURKIN,
FEAST OF LOVE: POPE JOHN PAUL II ON HUMAN INTIMACY (1983).
"' See supra note 28 and accompanying text. One commentator has pointed out the diffi-
culty of remaining faithful to one's religious beliefs in a secular society:
[T]he cost to a principled individual of failing to do his moral duty is generally se-
vere, in terms of supernatural sanction or the loss of moral self-respect. In the face of
these costs, the individual's refusal to obey the law may be inevitable, and therefore
in some perhaps unusual sense of the word, involuntary.
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REV. 327, 337 (1969).
The court noted that state universities may not constitutionally withhold recognition of
homosexual student groups. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 20 n.15. A university acting
"as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or association simply because it
finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent." Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-
88 (1972). However, the court concluded that Georgetown, as a private university, was under
no such restriction. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 20 n.15.
" See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. It is asserted that each of these additional
"facilities and services" would imply public approval, by linking the name of Georgetown
University with the GPGU and the GRC. Judge Belson addressed this concern by noting
that "[a]s a university, Georgetown is more than just bricks and mortar; it has a presence
beyond its physical confines, and must be concerned with its relationship with several cate-
gories of persons who are not physically present at its campus, e.g., potential students and
potential benefactors." Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 71 (Belson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
"' See Statement of Massachusetts Catholic Bishops (May 31, 1984), reprinted in HOMO-
SEXUALITY AND THE MAGISTERIUM, supra note 11, at 97.
Contemporary scholars make an important distinction between homosexual orienta-
tion ... and homosexual activity . . . .Such orientation is regarded generally as
morally neutral; it is viewed as a condition which, through no fault of the person
involved, implies a lack of complete sexual integration. Homosexual activity, on the
other hand, is seen as something objectively wrong inasmuch as it falls short of the
ultimate norm of genital expression, i.e., a relationship between male and female
within the marital union.
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Georgetown was prevented by Roman Catholic doctrine from discriminat-
ing against the groups because of the sexual orientation of their mem-
bers."3 It is emphasized that a question still exists as to whether
Georgetown's actions violated the Act's prohibition against discrimination
based on status alone. 3
Therefore, Georgetown is obligated to refrain from any practices that would result in
discrimination against students due to their status as homosexuals. See Gay Rights Coali-
tion, 536 A.2d at 73 n.17 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Both the GPGU
and GRC acknowledged that homosexual students were provided an equal opportunity to
"(a) receive a degree, (b) participate in student activities, (c) attend classes, (d) participate
in loan programs, (e) participate in athletic programs, (f) participate in awards and honor
programs, [and] (g) use the placement service." Id. (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
All such forms of prejudice fall short of the Christian norm and must be combatted to
the extent possible .... [T]he prejudice against homosexuals is a greater infringe-
ment of the norm of Christian morality than is homosexual orientation or activity.
The enormity of the moral evil of such prejudice should be obvious.
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE MAGISTERIUM, supra note 11, at 49-50.
It is asserted that Georgetown accommodated the student groups to the fullest extent
possible without violating the tenets of its faith, and sought a means of assuring the groups'
members "every human and civil right which is their due as persons, without, however,
neglecting the rights of the larger community." Statement of Archbishop John R. Roach on
Homosexuality, supra note 28, at 10.
31 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
33 See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 67 n.7 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Judge Belson suggested that the trial court failed to determine "that Georgetown
denied recognition because of the 'sexual orientation of any individuals'" and concluded
that the case should be remanded "for findings of fact and conclusions of law addressed
specifically to the statutory issues." Id. at 67 & n.7 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
Judge Mack concluded that President Healy's correspondence with the Chancellor of
the Medical Center offers "conclusive evidence that Georgetown took homosexual orienta-
tion into account in its recognition procedures." Id. at 28 (citing letter from President T.
Healy, S.J. to Chancellor M. McNulty (May 8, 1980)). It is submitted that Judge Belson was
correct in asserting that this conclusion was not adequately supported by the evidence at
hand.
In Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, reh'g en banc granted, 847 F.2d 1362
(9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that an Army regulation violated the con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection since it served to "target homosexual orientation
itself." Id. at 1337. Under that regulation, anyone who acknowledged their homosexuality
would be "conclusively barred from Army service." Id. However, in a vigorous dissent, Judge
Reinhardt explained that:
[Hiomosexuals are defined by their conduct-or, at the least, by their desire to en-
gage in certain conduct. With other groups, such as blacks or women, there is no
connection between particular conduct and the definition of the group. When conduct
that plays a central role in defining a group may be prohibited by the state, it cannot
be asserted with any legitimacy that the group is specially protected by the
Constitution.
Id. at 1357 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). While Watkins stands for the proposition that dis-
crimination against persons of homosexual orientation is unconstitutional, it is submitted
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It is suggested that Georgetown's religious objections were directed
only towards the promotion of homosexual conduct. 4 The University had
traditionally granted "University Recognition" to student organizations
whose stated purposes were civically oriented and, therefore, broadly
compatible with Catholic doctrine.3 5 Since the stated purposes of the
GPGU and GRC were presented as encouraging homosexual behavior,36
rather than merely promoting gay rights in general, it was determined by
Georgetown officials that the University would not subsidize groups that
encouraged activity antithetical to Church teachings.3 7 The court's hold-
ing in Gay Rights Coalition fails to adequately explain how such a deter-
mination by University officials rises to the level of "status" discrimina-
tion in light of the Church's antidiscriminatory prohibitions.3 " Thus, it is
highly questionable whether Georgetown even violated the District of Co-
that the case illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing "homosexual orientation" from "ho-
mosexual conduct."
See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 18. President Healy had "testified that the Univer-
sity does not distinguish between students on the basis of their sexual orientation and said
that group activity merely promoting the legal rights of gay people would present no reli-
gious conflict." Id.
" See id. at 17. Georgetown had granted "University Recognition" to the Jewish Students
Association, the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, and others. Id. at 17-18. Presi-
dent Healy noted that if the GPGU and the GRC were able to conform so as to be broadly
compatible with Church teachings, there would be no bar to recognition. Id.; see supra note
28 and accompanying text.
When a women's rights group had posted notices concerning artificial birth control and
abortion, President Healy investigated to determine whether the occurrence was "an iso-
lated instance or whether [they were] an essential part of the collective activity." Gay
Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 18.
" See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 8 nn.5-6. The matter which gave rise to the great-
est concern among the Georgetown officials was a provision in GPGU's Constitution which
provided that among its purposes was "the development of responsible sexual ethics conso-
nant with one's personal beliefs." Id. at 18. The University was similarly concerned with
GRC's stated "commitment to the provision of information to gay and lesbian law students
concerning 'Washington's gay community.'" Id. Thus, it was not the mere status of the
groups' members which created the conflict with Church doctrine, but rather, the stated
purposes of these groups which gave rise to such a conflict.
11 See id. at 19. President Healy stated that "a grant of 'University Recognition' to GPGU
and GRC would conflict with Georgetown's duty not to undermine the Roman Catholic
teaching that 'human sexuality can be exercised only within marriage.'" Id.
" See supra note 31 and accompanying text. For an illustration of "status" discrimination
against homosexuals, see Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. United States Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 541 F. Supp. 569, 588 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (government policy of
excluding alien homosexuals from entering United States solely because of their status as
homosexuals held unconstitutional), aff'd sub nor. Hill v. United States Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). But see In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439,
1450 n.56 (5th Cir. 1983) (by enacting Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(4), Congress
"clearly intended" to engage in status discrimination against homosexuals), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1219 (1984).
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lumbia's Human Rights Act.
THE BALANCING ANALYSIS
After concluding that the University had violated the Act,"9 the court
proceeded to apply the "balancing" analysis to determine whether the
government's interest in eliminating sexual orientation discrimination
was sufficiently compelling to override Georgetown's constitutional de-
fense. 0 However, the court erred by failing to consistently apply the
"compelled speech" analysis throughout the balancing process. In addi-
tion, the court failed to appreciate the centrality of the religious beliefs
that were threatened when it concluded that Georgetown's constitutional
claims were "substantially" outweighed by governmental interests.
The Gay Rights Coalition court chose to distinguish "endorsement"
from the various other tangible benefits contained in Georgetown's
scheme of "University Recognition"'" and proceeded to analyze each ele-
ment separately.42 Based on the plain meaning of the Act, the court con-
cluded that the University was not required to "endorse" any student
group. s In dictum, the court explained that any construction of the Act
that would require such "endorsement" would be violative of the first
amendment's prohibition against compelled expression.44 The court then
determined that the tangible benefits in question were merely "facilities
and services ' 5 and weighed the governmental interest only against
Georgetown's free exercise defense.46 As a result, the court apparently
concluded that a compelled expression analysis was unnecessary because
the tangible benefits at issue were not the equivalent of speech.' 7 Conse-
Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 30.
See id. at 30-39; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing balancing test).
41 See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 20. The court declared that this distinction was
"fundamental." Id.
42 Id. at 21-30.
" Id. at 21. The court reasoned that "the statute prohibits only a discriminatory denial of
access to 'facilities and services' provided by an educational institution" and concluded that
an "'endorsement' is neither." Id. (citation omitted).
4 See id. at 5. Although the court felt that it had construed the Act in such a way as not to
implicate Georgetown's free speech protections, see id., it nevertheless discussed a number
of Supreme Court cases illustrating the fact that Georgetown could not be forced to "em-
brace a repugnant philosophy." Id. at 22-26; see, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713
(1977) (state cannot constitutionally require individual to participate in dissemination of
ideological message); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compul-
sory flag salute violates first amendment).
4 Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 20 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520 (1987)); see supra
note 43.
See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 38-39.
' See id. at 20. The court concluded that the tangible benefits in question were "not an
abstract expression of the University's moral philosophy." Id. The court also noted that
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quently, the court erred in dismissing the issue of compelled speech.
In Wooley v. Maynard,4 8 the Supreme Court declared that the gov-
ernment may not compel a person to be a vehicle for an ideological point
of view with which he disagrees.4 9 Thus, it would appear that this abso-
lute protection would enable Georgetown to refrain from directly subsi-
dizing the activities of GPGU and GRC. Consequently, any construction
of the Act that would require the University to publicly associate itself
with the activities of these groups5" would be seen as an unconstitutional
intrusion upon Georgetown's right to free speech. Therefore, the court's
failure to conduct a free speech analysis with regard to the tangible bene-
fits resulted in a "short-weighting of Georgetown's first amendment rights
in the constitutional balancing process."51
GEORGETOWN'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
OUTWEIGHED
In order to ensure fairness in the balancing process, a reviewing court
should always consider the centrality and sincerity of the religious beliefs
Georgetown never alleged that compelled access to these facilities and services would "con-
stitute a forced subsidy of speech to which it is opposed." Id. at 26 n.21. It is submitted that
Georgetown never made this assertion and chose to litigate the case on an "all or nothing
basis" because Georgetown had no indication that a reviewing court would choose to make
such a distinction between the tangible and intangible benefits flowing from University Rec-
ognition. See id. at 20 n.16.
48 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
41 Id. at 713. The Supreme Court declared that "the right of freedom of thought protected
by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all." Id. at 714; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) (state requirement that public utility include in its
billing envelopes speech of third party with whom utility disagreed "impermissibly bur-
den[ed] appellant's First Amendment rights"). As Judge Mack pointed out, "the burden on
the utility's First Amendment rights was of a degree considerably less intrusive than it is
here." Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 24 n.19.
1* See supra notes 10, 11 & 30 and accompanying text. It is submitted that Georgetown
refused to grant access to these facilities because it would result in the University's name
being publicly associated with the group's activities. Georgetown had originally counter-
claimed to prevent the student groups from using "Georgetown University" in their names
but for undisclosed reasons chose not to appeal the trial court's dismissal of this claim. Gay
Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 14 n.12. Although the Gay Rights Coalition court stated that
the issue was no longer before them, it is asserted that this is actually an important basis for
Georgetown's defense. It is still unclear whether these groups may use the Georgetown
name. While Chief Judge Pryor determined that "Georgetown's refusal to allow the student
groups to use its name [wals not unlawful discrimination[,J" id. at 40 (Pryor, C.J., concur-
ring), Judge Ferren concluded that "Georgetown University may not lawfully refuse to ac-
cord the plaintiff gay rights groups... permission to use the university name." Id. at 46-47
(Ferren, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
51 Id. at 63 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text (discussing compelling state interest).
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
involved and the extent to which they would be affected by regulation.8 2
However, the Gay Rights Coalition court disregarded the sincerity of
Georgetown's objections when it determined that compelled access to the
tangible benefits would result in a "relatively slight burden on
Georgetown's religious practice.""3 The court neglected to emphasize the
fact that "compelled tolerance"'" of GPGU and GRC by the University
would result in the identification of Georgetown with these groups and
would thus violate Georgetown's religious obligation to refrain from as-
suming a stance of neutrality or indifference towards the purposes of
these groups." Therefore, by failing to appreciate the full extent of the
52 Bagni, supra note 5, at 1519 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). One com-
mentator has suggested that a proper determination of the constitutionality of a statute
would require the balancing of the governmental interest involved "against the claim for
religious liberty, which would [in turn] require calculation of two factors: first, the sincerity
and importance of the religious practice for which special protection is claimed; and second,
the degree to which the governmental regulation interferes with that practice." Giannella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381,
1390 (1967); see also Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 45 (Newman, J., concurring) ("the
Supreme Court has indicated that the compass of the right to free exercise of religion is
measured not only by the importance of the governmental interest but by the nature of the
burden imposed on the religious objector" (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606
(1961))); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1244 ("clearly a conflict which threatens the very sur-
vival of the religion or the core values of a faith poses more serious free exercise problems
than does a conflict which merely inconveniences the faithful").
" See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 38. Georgetown attempted to demonstrate that it
had fully accommodated GPGU and GRC by classifying the few remaining benefits yet to
be given to them as "relatively insignificant." Id. From this the court reasoned that total
compliance with the Act would result in a "relatively slight" burden on Georgetown's first
amendment rights. Id. It is asserted, however, that the fact that Georgetown characterized
the benefits to be derived by GPGU and GRC as "relatively insignificant" does not neces-
sarily imply that the burden on its first amendment rights would also be "relatively slight."
See id. at 58-59 (Ferren, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Ferren con-
cluded that the Act would require Georgetown merely to "tolerate" the groups and provide
a forum for their views. Id. at 53 (Ferren, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). By
disagreeing with the majority's definition of "endorsement," Judge Ferren reasoned that a
university would not be required to approve of ideas but would simply have "to let someone
else have a say without indicating what [it] . . . think[s] about it." Id. at 59 (Ferren, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Belson, however, defined "tolerate" to mean
"to not interfere with; allow; permit" and concluded that "Georgetown has tolerated fully
the activities of the student groups." Id. at 68 n.12 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
** See supra note 28 and accompanying text. It is asserted that the "tangible benefits" at
issue in this case are the equivalent of "endorsement." As Judge Ferren concluded, if the
Act is construed so as to require compelled endorsement, it is difficult to "comprehend how
enforcement of student access to visible, tangible benefits such as an office, a telephone,
mailing services, and advertising privileges financed by the university would be any less
evidently an unconstitutional requirement." Id. at 51 (Ferren, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
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burden that was placed on Georgetown's rights to free exercise and free
expression, the court attributed insufficient weight to Georgetown's con-
stitutional claims in the balancing process.
It follows that the court erred in its determination that the govern-
ment's legitimate interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination
was sufficiently compelling to override Georgetown's constitutional de-
fense." Although the District of Columbia has chosen to attach great im-
portance to this interest,57 the Supreme Court has yet to identify homo-
sexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal protection purposes.58
It is therefore suggested that Georgetown's constitutional claims were suf-
ficient to overcome the asserted governmental interests.
LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES WERE AVAILABLE
The District of Columbia may only justify an inroad on Georgetown's
religious liberty by showing that no less restrictive means were available
to achieve the governmental interests involved.59 Furthermore, if a con-
struction of the Act is fairly possible by which the constitutional question
may be avoided, then the court is mandated to construe the statute so as
to avoid the issue of constitutionality."0 Therefore, the Gay Rights Coali-
tion court was required to interpret the Act so as to protect homosexuals
against sexual orientation discrimination without unnecessarily burdening
66 See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 38. However, Judge Belson, in disagreeing with the
majority, explained that "the act of. . . the District of Columbia Council, in identifying a
governmental interest and adopting legislation to serve it, cannot, of itself, establish that
the interest is so compelling as to override competing constitutional rights." Id. at 73 (Bel-
son, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See generally supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text (discussing balancing compelling state interest with sincere religious beliefs).
67 See Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 978 (D.C. 1984) ("elimination of discrimination
within the District of Columbia should have 'highest priority' ").
66 See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that Supreme Court's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), indicates Court would not find homo-
sexuals to be suspect class). But see Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349
reh'g en banc granted, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (distinguishing Padula and
concluding that persons of homosexual orientation constitute suspect group under equal
protection doctrine). However, it is submitted that Watkins is distinguishable since it in-
volved discrimination against persons based solely upon their "status" as homosexuals.
" See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (challenged regulation
must be least restrictive means by which government can attain its compelling end); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1982) (same); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-
19 (1981) (same). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 846-59 (discussing requirement of
least restrictive means to compelling end).
'0 See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (federal statutes are to be construed to
avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality). The Act must be construed so as to protect
the rights of homosexuals without becoming unnecessarily entangled in a constitutional is-
sue. See generally 1, 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 2.01, 45.11
(4th ed. 1985).
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the University's constitutionally protected rights.
Since Georgetown's objections focused upon the stated purposes of
GPGU and GRC, which implicitly included the promotion of homosexual
conduct," the court should have considered the option of having the
groups restructure their constitutions to become more broadly compatible
with the goals of the University.2 Such an approach would have consti-
tuted the least restrictive means of promoting the District of Columbia's
interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination, while still pre-
serving Georgetown's first amendment rights. 3 Alternatively, the court
could have chosen to grant the groups access only to those facilities and
services that would not have been associated with the name of
Georgetown."' A concurring jurist determined that this would result in a
"separate but equal" treatment of homosexuals at the University.6 5 How-
ever, it is asserted that students entering a Catholic university cannot
reasonably expect direct subsidy of their promotion of activities antitheti-
cal to Church teachings.
CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has determined that the
Human Rights Act requires religiously affiliated institutions to directly
subsidize activities that are antithetical to their own religious beliefs.
This construction, besides standing in direct opposition to the first
amendment prohibition against compelled expression, significantly im-
pairs the free exercise of religious beliefs by those institutions. In its at-
tempt to provide for the protection of homosexual rights, the Gay Rights
Coalition court has unconstitutionally attempted to promote social equal-
ity at the expense of religious liberty.
66
6, See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. If the objectionable clauses of the consti-
tutions were reworded so as to promote homosexual rights generally, rather than homosex-
ual conduct, it is submitted that Georgetown would have no objection to providing access to
all tangible benefits.
63 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 10, 30 & 50 and accompanying text.
" See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 49 (Ferren, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
66 Subsequent to the preparation of this Comment, Congress proposed an amendment to
the District of Columbia Human Rights Act that would exempt religious institutions from
compliance with the Act's provisions requiring recognition of homosexual organizations.
Originally introduced by Sen. William Armstrong (R-Colo.), the "Armstrong Amend-
ment" would terminate all funding to the District of Columbia if the city does not enact
changes to the Act so as to provide an exemption for religious educational facilities. The
amendment states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the laws of the District of Columbia, it shall
not be an unlawful discriminatory practice in the District of Columbia for any educa-
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tional institution that is affiliated with a religious organization or closely associated
with the tenets of a religious organization to deny, restrict, abridge, or condition-
(A) the use of any fund, service, facility, or benefit; or (B) the granting of any
endorsement, approval, or recognition to any person or persons that are organized for,
or engaged in, promoting, encouraging, or condoning any homosexual act, lifestyle,
orientation, or belief.
The Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 100-462,
102 Stat. 2283 (1988).
The District of Columbia Council has sought to challenge the propriety of Congress'
attempt to condition the expenditure of public funds in this manner.
